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Introduction   


Mercosur was founded with the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 and included Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Of these, Brazil is by far the biggest country and has the largest population and GDP, although its GDP per capita lags behind that of Argentina and Uruguay. In recent years there has been an attempt to widen out regional integration in South America to the continental level. The foundation of Unasur in 2007 that includes all South American states was a step in that direction.

However, the cooperation of both Mercosur and Unasur encounters a number of barriers to the deepening of regional integration as well as to the cohesion of the members. The relative strategic importance attached to regional integration at the two levels in the foreign policy orientations of the member states also differs, reflecting different perceptions of how to defend the national interests of member states. These different orientations may be connected to differences in economic structures, different types of insertion in the global economy as well as to the differing ideological orientations of the governments. It is therefore interesting to consider the prospects of regional integration in South America on the basis of these challenges as well as to evaluate the results of the recent regional integration processes. This is what I set out to do. The issue of how positive or negative the recent regional integration process should be seen is of great interest, since analysts differ substantially in their assessments of this issue.

Regional integration agreements may focus on the economic realm alone or on other dimensions as well. In this paper I will highlight the economic aspects of regional integration, as I believe that regional integration in South America is largely motivated by economic concerns. Foreign policy of developing countries typically revolves around the issue of economic development, and this is also the case in South America. In the aftermath of the Cold War there has been a proliferation of economic integration agreements. These agreements can be seen as strategic responses to the globalization process, and the analysis of regional integration in South America in the present paper deals with this wave of “new regionalism” in the current historical period where regional economic integration can be seen as a structural tendency in the global economy. Historically, regional economic integration initiatives in Latin America such as LAFTA, the Andes Pact and the Central American Common Market, all established in the 1960s in order to overcome development bottlenecks through enlarged regional markets, ran into difficulties due to different national interests. Thus, the history of regional economic integration does not seem promising for the current arrangements, and it is to be expected that a number of challenges will have to be addressed in order to assure the progress, relevance and continuation of the regional integration processes emphasized in this paper.
  
Theoretically, the paper does not start from a view that any particular kind of regional integration is normatively to be preferred to other types. Thus, regional integration may or may not lead to authoritative supranational institutions. It may instead take the form of inter-governmentalism. Instead I assume as José María Fanelli (2007: 2) that regional economic integration agreements at the end of the day will be judged on the basis of their ability to contribute to national economic development. Therefore, the conception of national interests and the interpretation of how best to advance these is pivotal to the process of regional integration. As Aldo Ferrer argues (2006), Mercosur is only useful for the member states if it is compatible with their own economic development. In analyzing this issue in relation to Mercosur and Unasur I take a state-oriented approach and therefore emphasize the supply conditions of support for regional economic integration at the government level. This approach has been chosen because regional integration initiatives in South America since the early 1990s largely have been developed at the level of political elites and to a lesser degree reflect demand from society. Still analyses of society based demands with an impact on how elites view and relate to the politics of regional integration are relevant, but in this paper I shall limit the analysis to the level of elites.

The interpretation of how to advance national interests is assumed to be context specific and to relate to the characteristics of national economies and to specific international contextual situations. Therefore, the paper is structured in three historical parts characterized by somewhat different contexts that have influenced how regional integration has been viewed at the level of political elites. In the first part, I briefly analyze the emergence and development of Mercosur from 1991 to 1998 on the background of an initial bilateral cooperation initiative between its two biggest members Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s. Then I briefly analyze the difficulties encountered by the regional integration process in the period 1999-2002 as the member states experienced developmental set-backs. The main part of the paper then analyzes the new orientation of Mercosur from 2003 and the attempt at creating integration at the South American level. 

From PICAB to Mercosur as a Costums Union (1986-1998)
Integration in Mercosur and in Unasur depends to some extent on a positive bilateral relationship between Argentina and Brazil that can be seen as the axis of Mercosur. Mercosur was also established on the background of the decision of the presidents of Argentina and Brazil in 1985 to initiate an economic integration process bilaterally. Confronted with the development crisis provoked by the debt crisis in both countries, they set-out to improve their economic development possibilities with the help of bilateral economic integration. The goal was to create a common market eventually in order to take advantage of the larger economic scale this would provide. However, the first steps taken were the establishment of 24 protocols of cooperation in specific economic sectors, particularly in the industrial sector that had suffered somewhat under the balance of payments problems set off by the debt crisis in the first part of the 1980s (Christensen, 2007: 4-5).

However, the persistence of severe balance of payments problems hindered substantial progress. At the same time, when Mexico and the United States started talks on a North American regional economic integration scheme in 1990, and president Bush suggested that this cooperation could be spread to the whole Western Hemisphere with the help of subregional economic integration schemes, i.e. at a level smaller than the whole Western Hemisphere, as a stepping stone this prompted a revival of regional integration in Latin America. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, this led to the widening of their bilateral integration scheme with the establishment of Mercosur in 1991. Furthermore, the experience of external vulnerability in both countries led to a rethinking of economic development strategy and the framing of Mercosur as an experiment in “open integration” where integration was coupled with uni-lateral economic liberalization towards third countries and the withdrawal of the state from its very active role in planning economic development (ibid). This policy was in line with the so-called Washington Consensus policies that have come to be seen as the embodiment of neo-liberal thinking. The idea was to tackle the problem of external economic vulnerability and recurring balance of payments crises through a combination of strict fiscal policies, privatization of state companies and the opening up of the economies to international competition as a way to foster productive efficiency and as a way to attract foreign investments. These were seen as important in reigniting economic growth, and Mercosur was seen as an element in the strategy of attracting these investments as the gradual elimination of intra-regional trade barriers would create a larger internal market.

As regional interdependence started out at a low level there were not a great demand from society for the establishment of Mercosur, instead it was created as a consequence of the political will of the governments of the member countries (Malamud, 2008). It was not clear, however, if Mercosur members envisioned the same goals. For the Brazilian political elites, Mercosur has mostly been seen as a strategic priority in Brazil’s international strategy, whereas Argentina is often seen as less engaged in Mercosur and as having a greater interest in a hemispheric free trade agreement including the United States (Bernal-Meza, 1999).  

Mercosur can be seen as a strategic and defensive reaction to the development problems encountered by the member countries. The motivation for Mercosur was therefore largely pragmatic, namely that Mercosur should be a vehicle for national development for the member states. The form taken by the integration scheme was inspired by the strong current of liberal thinking in the context. Free trade was to be created through linear and automatic tariff reductions in all sectors, although some exceptions in sensitive areas were allowed all countries, mainly the smaller economies. In 1994 Mercosur developed further into a customs union with a common external tariff and the allowance of some exceptions due to national interests emanating from the differences in national economic structures (Christensen, 2007). According to Terra (2008: 14), though, the common external tariff, largely reflected Brazilian interests, particularly in pivotal economic sectors such as capital goods, information technology and tele communication, that is in the advanced sectors where the common external tariff improved Brazil’s competitiveness in the sub-regional market.

Observers of Mercosur’s integration process tend to see Mercosur’s initial period from 1991 to 1998 as a successful period due to the combination of renewed economic growth and a significant increase in economic interdependence within Mercosur. Whereas intra-Mercosur exports just above US$ 4 billion in 1990 made up just 8,9% of total Mercosur exports, the figure had moved up to above US$ 20 billion in 1998 where it made up 25% of total Mercosur exports (CEPAL, 2001: 10).

However, when Brazil succumbed to pressures from international capital markets and led its currency, the Real, flow, thereby setting off a significant devaluation, frictions between Mercosur member states started mounting (Fanelli, 2007: 3) and Mercosur entered a crisis period in its regional integration process. This crisis was provoked by the negative consequences Brazil’s devaluation and balance of payments difficulties had on the other member countries and by the development crisis that they came to experience in the period up until 2002. The development crisis was also a consequence of significant external economic imbalances that provoked a new round of balance of payments crises in the other member countries. This showed the weakness of the development strategies that the member states had adopted during the 1990s as they had depended excessively on foreign savings and created growing foreign debt loads. Basically, Mercosur had not provided the successful platform for international competitiveness that had been one of the aims behind its creation. Imports had soared during this first period of Mercosur’s existence while the dynamism of exports had been insufficient to assure macro-economic stability.


Mercosur’s Crisis: 1999-2002
Brazil’s devaluation and economic downturn led to a fall in intra-regional trade. This was particularly serious for Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay that all had come to develop a high degree of dependence on intra-Mercosur exports during Mercosur’s first phase. Argentina’s  dependence on Mercosur for its exports topped in 1998 when it reached approximately 35% of total exports (INTAL, 2002: 28). Therefore, the great drop of around one third in Argentina’s exports to Brazil in 1999 was a serious blow to Argentina (Bernal-Meza, 2002: …). In the case of Uruguay, exports to Mercosur also reached its maximum level in 1998 with exports to Mercosur contributing with more than 50% of total exports compared to around 36% in 1991 (INTAL, 1999: Apéndice, p. 10). Uruguay, in other words, had come to depend strongly on Mercosur for its exports.

The Brazilian devaluation led to a deterioration of Argentina’s competitiveness vis-a-vis Brazil (Terra, 2008: 20; INTAL, 2001: 32)). These negative developments provoked a surge in trade conflicts in a large number of sectors within Mercosur in 1999 and 2000, particularly between Argentina and Brazil (INTAL, 2000: 25-60). The problems of Mercosur were exacerbated by the economic crisis experienced by particularly Argentina and Uruguay but also to some extent by Paraguay in the period from 1999 to 2002. This crisis was not just provoked by Brazil’s devaluation but also by the growing external vulnerability that the member countries shared (Fanelli, 2007). But, since the three smallest members were significantly more dependent on the Brazilian market than Brazil was on the markets of Mercosur, and since Brazil achieved improved export results outside the region after the devaluation in 1999, it was particularly the smaller member countries that were hurt. Argentina saw its GDP fall every year between 1999 and 2002 when Argentina had to introduce a moratorium on its foreign debt payments. In 2002 alone, Argentina’s GDP fell by 10,9%. Uruguay experienced a similar deterioration in its GDP of 11,0% in 2002 (INTAL, 2007: Anexo 1: i). In 2002, intra-Mercosur trade over-all fell to 55% of its level in 2000 (INTAL, 2002: 26). This was particularly serious for the two smallest member countries, not the least for Uruguay. With Argentina in a major crisis and Brazil in an economic slump, Uruguay’s strong dependence on these markets became a major problem as the average fall in Uruguay’s exports to Mercosur in the period from 1999 to 2002 reached 15,5% (Valls Pereira, 2006: 41). In this way Uruguay learnt that it was risky to depend strongly on intra-Mercosur trade due to the macro-economic instability and external vulnerability of the economies of the member countries.

The reaction to the downturn in the region was that member states started to focus on national development problems and goals (Fanelli, 2007: 1). It is likely that the different sector conflicts reflected demands from producers in these sectors for the state to protect them from unfair competition from Brazil. This issue will not be explored further here, however. In any case, the many trade conflicts represented a reversal in the intra-regional free trade agenda. The de-industrialization process in Argentina and Uruguay (Baumann and Mussi, 2006) was relevant in provoking demands for protection of their industrial sectors and for policies that could help to set in motion a process of re-industrialization. In the same way, conflicts over the common external tariffs arose as particularly the three smaller members wished to revise these common external tariffs (INTAL, 2000: chapter 3) due to the view that it particularly favoured Brazilian interests. Another challenge was the criticism brought by smaller members that Brazil through its public policies, e.g. its use of subsidies to attract foreign direct investment distorted competition in the region (ibid).

Criticisms of the functioning of Mercosur were centred on three main issues, namely that development results of the members were asymmetrical and that the set-up of Mercosur’s trade regime and Brazil’s public policies exacerbated these asymmetries to the advantage of Brazil. The crisis of Mercosur started a debate about the need to re-launch Mercosur, but the crisis conditions got in the way of this as governments focused on national solutions to their development crises. As a consequence of this some analysts started questioning the survival of Mercosur or to consider the likelihood that Mercosur might reverse to a simple incomplete free trade agreement due to the different interests of the member states.

Fanelli (2007: 2) argues that the crisis of Mercosur during 1999-2002 shows the weaknesses of the governance structures of Mercosur. The strongly inter-governmental approach to regional integration when faced with a crisis provoked a situation where governments seemed unconcerned with saving the process of regional integration. The emphasis on national interests to the detriment of the integration process shows that Mercosur was largely seen as a vehicle that ought to serve national development interests and if it did not do so it was logical to challenge its rules. One way of evaluating this logic is to argue that Mercosur’s institutional structure was underdeveloped and did not protect the integration scheme. However, as Aldo Ferrer has argued (2006), Mercosur should serve the interests of the member countries and their economic development. Therefore, the development away from a rules-based emphasis towards a result-oriented approach to regional integration can be seen as a positive development that was necessary in order to build the possible Mercosur and not the ideal structure of a complete free trade area and a perfect customs union. This is not to say that there should not be rules in Mercosur. Clearly, there should be, otherwise there would be no reason to have a regional integration scheme. However, in the situation faced by Mercosur during the crisis, a flexible attitude was necessary on the part of Brazil as the dominant economy in order to save Mercosur. Thus, Brazil’s strategic interest in defending Mercosur can be seen as an important reason for its survival. As Laura Gómez Mera has convincingly argued (2005) another important element that explains Mercosur’s survival is the convergent strategic interests of Argentina and Brazil in maintaining Mercosur based on defensive considerations related to their common feeling of external vulnerability. In other words, Mercosur as a platform for joint negotiations in international fora was valued by both states as this arrangement could help them aggregate power. Of course, a more cohesive posture was called for if Mercosur was to credibly defend common interests internationally. Such a posture was developed to some extent in the period from 2003 to 2008, although bilateral conflicts have never completely subsided. At the same time, Brazil’s strategic and offensive interest in promoting regional integration has been expanded from the level of Mercosur to the level of South America after Mercosur’s crisis between 1999 and 2002. I now turn to discuss this last period that leads to the present time in order to evaluate regional integration at the level of Mercosur and South America considering the relative merit of an optimistic or a pessimistic view of how this process has developed in the period from 2003 to 2008. The evaluation emphasizes if regional integration serves its purpose of fostering national economic development and of providing a regional platform for international competitiveness and defence of the interests of member states on the international stage.


Mercosur/Unasur: 2003-2008
National development strategies and regional integration strategies as well as overall international strategies of South American governments from 2003 and up until today are best understood on the background of the development experiences of the period leading up to 2003.

What particularly characterizes these developments, which, of course, differ between national cases, is the relatively poor development results achieved through neo-liberal development strategies and the associated “open regionalism” strategy of Mercosur and CAN (Community of Andean Nations). As we have seen above, these developments led to nationalist responses in the case of Mercosur and provoked some reversals in the integration process as a number of breeches were observed in terms of intra-regional free trade rules and the application of the common external tariff. 

In sum, poor development results led to a focus on the domestic realm, most particularly a focus on revitalizing national economies and improve living conditions. This meant that regional integration faced serious challenges from this type of “centrifugal tendencies”. As Marco Aurélio García has argued (García, 2008), this development to a large extent was caused by different national interests, although it was coupled with the opposite tendency of a strengthened interest in regional integration. I would argue that the two most important factors behind this renewed emphasis on regional integration were firstly a common feeling of external vulnerability and a desire to use regional integration as a platform for international trade negotiations, and in relation to this, the second factor was that Brazil now saw a greater opening for and interest in prioritizing regional integration in South America over close cooperation with the United States, although this tendency was not shared by all South American governments. This spurred Brazil to take a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening South American regional integration which plays a central role in Brazil’s development strategy and in its strategy of international economic insertion (see, e.g. Christensen, 2007b).Brazil’s offensive interests in regional integration and in a leadership role in South America, in competition with the United States (and secondarily Venezuela) is therefore a key factor in the push towards strengthened regional integration in the period from 2003 to 2008, and the experience of external vulnerability, economic crisis and crisis of regional integration in Mercosur in the period 1999 to 2002 helps explain why regional integration has been pursued by other means in the last few years than in the 1990s. 

In the following I first discuss the “positive” and “negative” tendencies of regional integration in Mercosur. After this I discuss the drive towards South American regional integration and the “positive” and “negative” tendencies that characterize this process. By “positive” and “negative”, I mean tendencies that show an interest in further integration and tendencies that can be seen as difficulties in assuring regional cohesion and the prioritization of regional integration.

Mercosur: Regional Integration in the Period 2003 to 2008.
Following the severe development crisis of Argentina in the period from 1999 to 2002 and the bilateral strives that this had provoked between Argentina and Brazil in the trade area, Argentina and Brazil reached a common understanding of the principles that should govern their economic development strategies and international relations in 2003. This agreement, known as the “Buenos Aires Consensus”, was reached between the two new presidents, Argentina’s Néstor Kirchner of the Peronist party (PJ) and Brazil’s Luíz Inácio da Silva of the Workers Party (PT). This document presents a criticism of the results of “neo-liberalism” and a defence of more autonomous policies. It also underlines the importance of regional integration at the level of Mercosur and of expanding South American regional integration (Christensen, 2007). In this way there was again an express interest in ‘re-launching’ Mercosur, as well as in widening regional integration to the level of the South American continent. From the perspective of the Lula government, this strategy aimed at developing a more autonomous South American development strategy and at gaining leadership in the region (Christensen, 2007b). This meant that Argentina and Brazil started this period with a vision of the external strategy of the region that was more aligned than it had been in the 1990’s where Argentina had placed greater emphasis on a close relationship to the United States.

The more defined common vision of the priority given to Mercosur was clearly observable in the FTAA negotiations in Miami in November 2003, i.e. briefly after the formulation of the Buenos Aires Consensus. In the FTAA negotiations it became evident that it would not be possible to reach the ambitious goals for hemispheric free trade set out by the United States. The main reason for this was to be found in the position of the United States and of Mercosur. Mercosur was unwilling to agree to the rules promoted by the United States in areas such as government procurement, investments and the service sector, i.e. the areas where the United States had offensive interests due to their competitive advantages. The position of Mercosur was that in order to make compromises in these areas, the United States would have to give something in return in the agricultural area. As the United States was unwilling to negotiate agricultural trade in the FTAA process based on the argument that these negotiations should be conducted at the multilateral level in the WTO trade talks, the outcome of the Miami negotiations was that no substantial agreement could be reached between the United States and Mercosur (Bouzas, 2005). 

At the internal level of Mercosur it was harder to reach agreement and a common understanding, however. This is largely due to continued bilateral trade conflicts between Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has introduced a number of unilateral trade policies breaking internal Mercosur rules and it has argued for introducing a new safeguard mechanism in Mercosur that would allow Argentina to introduce protectionist measures temporarily if a surge in imports was experienced in some sector of the economy. This policy position is a continuation of the policies pursued during the crisis years 1999-2002 and can be seen as an example of the national orientation of Argentina after the economic crisis. Argentina wished to re-industrialize after its experience of loss of competitiveness in the industrial sector that had provoked a de-industrialization process. Although Brazil resisted Argentina’s position for some time, it ended up agreeing to the proposed safeguard mechanism that was introduced in 2006 (Terra, 2008: 20). This shows Brazil’s flexibility and willingness to accommodate concerns from its most important partner in Mercosur. This flexibility has been criticized internally in Brazil by the political opposition and business organizations, but the policy has been defended by others noting Brazil’s large trade surpluses with Argentina in recent years and the understandable and legitimate concern of the Argentine government to assure re-industrialization as a core objective in the national development strategy (Christensen, 2007b). The inclusion of the safeguard mechanism (MAC: Medida de Adecuación Competitiva) in the rules governing Mercosur can be seen as an example of its strengthened emphasis on the need to actively fight development asymmetries. Furthermore, this emphasis inspires Brazilian regional policy strongly and should be seen as a core component in Brazil’s foreign policy under the Lula government (see e.g. García, 2008; Guimarães 2006).       

The problem of asymmetries has also created tensions in the two smallest members of Mercosur. Along with this, Uruguay and Argentina have been in a long-lasting conflict over a foreign investment in a paper factory due to Argentine worries over the environmental damage that could be caused in the river between the two countries. After the ascension of Paraguay’s new left-wing president Fernando Lugo (?), Paraguay has demanded a new agreement with Brazil on the price of the electricity generated at the huge bi-national Itaipú dam. Brazil imports most of Paraguay’s 50% share in total electricity generation and pay a low price, according to an old agreement, but Lugo finds the price unreasonably low and hopes that a price hike will generate a boost to Paraguayan development. This kind of resource nationalism finds a parallel in Bolivia’s development strategy as well as in Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s development strategies and will be discussed in the section on South American regional integration below.  

In terms of Uruguay’s dissatisfaction with development asymmetries and asymmetries in the regional integration scheme, this provoked dissatisfaction in Uruguay with the external policy of Mercosur towards the United States, as Uruguay wished to make a free trade and investment agreement with the United States that could help Uruguay re-ignite economic growth. This led to a tense situation where Brazil threatened Uruguay with exclusion of Mercosur if it broke the rules of the customs union. However, Uruguay eventually made an agreement with the United States that did not conflict with the customs union. On its part, Brazil acknowledged that Mercosur had not lived up to its promises for the smaller member states and sought ways to improve on this situation by way of promising Brazilian investments in Uruguay and allowing the Brazilian development bank BNDES to finance projects in Uruguay (Christensen, 2007b). Similarly, a regional structural development fund (FOCEM) was introduced in the institutional make-up of Mercosur in 2006. This innovation was a way for the biggest countries to signal a willingness to treat the problem of economic asymmetries (Mercadante, 2006) It is true that the 100 million US$ allocated to FOCEM in the first place is a very small amount (Malamud, 2008) and that this may reflect the problem that although Brazil is the biggest economy it is still a poor country with strong fiscal limits and very serious domestic development problems, and, to top it off, Brazil’s GDP per capita trails the GDP per capita of Argentina and Uruguay (Giordano, Moreira and Quevedo, 2003). This limits Brazil’s capacity and perhaps willingness to make a strong effort in this area to cement its regional leadership. However, I would argue that Brazil, given its development status, can better provide leadership through other means such as e.g. promoting productive investments in its South American neighbour countries and showing flexibility in bilateral relations as in the case of Argentina’s wish for safeguard mechanisms in Mercosur.

So how is regional integration developing in Mercosur? It is not easy to make a clear statement on this point. Clearly, Mercosur has experienced a long range of intra-regional conflicts during the period treated here and nationalist centrifugal tendencies have surely been strong and give the impression that member states often do not really respect the rules of the game in Mercosur. The tensions emanating from this tendency of disrespect for Mercosur rules should be understood on the background of severe national development crises that have created demands from societies for nationally oriented policies that could be said to harm the cohesion of the group and the interest in regional integration. On the other hand, Mercosur has survived this test. New rules have been created that show the capacity of Mercosur to adapt to crisis conditions and to start looking for ways to deal with economic asymmetries and asymmetrical outcomes. This adaptability is a positive sign, and I believe it reflects Brazil’s goal of building regional cohesion by a flexible attitude that may gradually create the perception in the other member states that Mercosur works for them and that Brazil is willing to take on some “burdens” as the informal leader of the group. Brazil does not only do this as a reflection of its government’s left-wing ideological orientation and generosity – reflecting what has been called a position of “solidarity” in international affairs – but also due to self-interests. Brazil runs large trade surpluses with its Mercosur partners, especially Argentina, and has a strong interest in maintaining a good relationship. This suggests that, in spite of the criticism from the opposition of an overly “ideological” policy towards its regional partners that does not protect Brazilian interests, there may be a strong motivation to maintain a good relationship with Argentina regardless of who wins the next presidential election in Brazil. 

Unasur and the drive towards South American regional integration
In the following, I briefly discuss the main difficulties confronting the project of regional integration at the level of South America as well as the potentially positive prospects.

In 2003 Mercosur and the Andes countries reached free trade agreements that opened the way for the construction of a South American wide integration scheme, the Community of South American nations (CASA), that later was renamed Union of the South (Unasur) and includes all South American states as members.

It is as of yet not completely clear how the relationship between Mercosur, CAN and Unasur should be and if Unasur could maybe end up making Mercosur and CAN unnecessary. However, at the moment it makes sense to speak of regional integration in two speeds. The level of integration in Mercosur is deeper than at the continental level. Also, Peru, Chile and Colombia have negotiated bilateral free trade agreements with the United States (Colombia’s agreement has still not been ratified by the United States). This further complicates the matter, as these agreements go deeper in certain aspects than Unasur as they are built on the model of NAFTA that includes those elements of deep integration that Mercosur was unwilling to accept in FTAA negotiations with the United States in Miami in November of 2003. Therefore, it is not clear that it will be possible to find a common front towards the United States. The fact that Venezuela left CAN in 2004 exactly because of Peru’s and Colombia’s decision to make bilateral preferential (free) trade agreements with the United States along the NAFTA lines that Venezuela condemn for including neo-colonial aspects underscores the enormous distance in foreign policy orientations of the member states.

The diplomatic crisis that erupted in March 2008 when Colombian military entered Ecuador’s territory and killed a group of FARC guerrillas, including one of its most prominent members, is one more element that shows the difficulty of creating a successful regional integration process in the future.

On the positive side, it is noteworthy that the South American states have all willingly joined Unasur in spite of nationalist tendencies, as in the case of Bolivia’s nationalization of oil and gas resources that had a negative impact on Brazilian economic interests in the sector (Christensen, 2007b) and in spite of the very different foreign policy orientations of different governments, notably Chile and Venezuela.

The central element to regional integration in Unasur at the time being is infrastructure and energy integration. In this way, the region focuses on concrete investment projects in areas that are potentially in the common interests of member states. This approach parallels the EU’s focus on coal and steel in the first period of its existence. Furthermore, Unasur emphasizes the goal of reducing development asymmetries. If this goal is followed up by concrete action this could create strong support in South America. On the other hand, it is too early to say if the official aim will also be followed up by significant actions that create desired results. This both depends on the political will of leading states and on the financial capacity to carry out investment projects. It also depends on the economic development of the region which, at the time is unsure, due to the international financial crisis that may be developing into an international developmental crisis. How this may affect the South American region and the regional integration project of Unasur, as well as Mercosur, is unclear.

Conclusion
In the analysis I have sought to establish a foundation for evaluating the relative success of Mercosur’s regional integration process in the period from 2003 to 2008, and I have briefly touched upon regional integration at the continental level of South America.

I conclude that Mercosur is still facing difficulties. These relate to centrifugal tendencies provoked by nationalist orientations which in turn are largely to be explained on the background of the lack of development success during Mercosur’s first phases prior to 2003. In spite of these difficulties Mercosur has survived due to common strategic interests of Argentina and Brazil in terms of their foreign policy orientations and due to Brazil’s strategic interest in strengthening regional integration as a way to enhance its own development and to provide a platform for a stronger global political role for Brazil. On this background, some creative developments as the MAC and Focem have occurred showing the flexibility of particularly Brazil and of Mercosur’s capacity to adapt to stresses. It is not completely clear how this combination of problematic and positive developments should be evaluated. On the one hand, one could argue as Aldo Ferrer that what we see is a movement away from a rules-oriented Mercosur towards a results-oriented Mercosur and an attempt to construct the possible Mercosur. On this positive note one can observe renewed strength of intra-regional trade. On the other hand, the inter-governmental set-up and the posture of the governments of the smallest states seem to get in the way of more permanent commitments and institutional strengthening and could eventually lead to a situation where the commitment to Mercosur of different members may be questioned. There is a danger that the current international economic crisis may lead to a new crisis of intra-Mercosur trade if the member countries go into economic recessions. Such a scenario may provoke renewed centrifugal tendencies that could get in the way of Mercosur’s progress and perhaps even its existence. At the moment, the member states are discussing how they may enhance intra-regional trade in the context of the international economic crisis. If these discussions lead to positive results this could strengthen the perception of Mercosur’s importance amongst member states and in their civil societies.

With regard to Unasur, it is too early to conclude. What can be said is that Unasur is a positive development that shows the vigour of regional integration will in South America and the strong commitment of Brazil to pursue such a process. The emphasis on concrete investment projects in infrastructure and energy could create perceptions of common interests in the regional development project and may help strengthen the South American economy systemically. Similarly, the emphasis on reducing development asymmetries may help foster support for Unasur in economically weak countries. However, there are a number of difficulties that could get in the way of Unasur’s success. The development strategies and foreign policy orientations of the member states are very varied and may create tensions in the region and get in the way of the ability to find common solutions. Finally, the current international development crisis may provoke an economic downturn in the region. If this happens, it may be hard to do anything substantial in terms of reducing economic asymmetries, the investments in infrastructure and energy may be hindered and the regional integration project may end up being viewed as unable to create meaningful results. 
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